RECENT CASES
Banks and Banking-Accommodation Paper-Right of Receiver To Recover on
"Window Dressing" Bond-[Federal].-A bank's officer persuaded the general agent
of the defendant to issue security bonds which were to be shown as collateral for several
worthless loans, so that the loans would pass inspection of the bank commissioners.
No premiums were paid, and the officer gave the general agent letters releasing the defendant from liability. The examiners permitted the bank to remain open and several
large deposits were made in partial reliance upon the apparent security of the loans.
The bank became insolvent and the receiver brought this action to recover on the
bonds after default of the loans. On appeal from a judgment for the defendant, held,
affirmed. The receiver is subject to all defenses available against the bank. Deitrickv.
StandardSurety and Casualty Co.i
The receiver of an insolvent bank is its "statutory assignee"'2 and represents both
creditors and stockholders.3 He is usually4 appointed by the Comptroller of Currency
for national banks,s or by the superintendent of banking for the state banks.6 The
prevalent maxim in respect to the power of a receiver is that "he stands in the shoes of
the bank."7 A line of federal cases,' which follow Rankin v. City Nat'l. Bank9 have held
that there is no exception to this general doctrine in situations similar to the instant
case. Hence, since the bank is bound by the acts of its officers,xo a third person, whose
fraudulent "window dressing" bonds have made possible a deception of the examiners
and creditors of a bank, can invoke the defense of either lack of consideration or a collateral contract granting release from liability, in an action by the receiver on the
bonds. Although the generalization, upon which the Rankin case is based, that the
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receiver acquires no greater rights than the bank," has been applied in the fraudulent
accommodation note cases, the courts have recognized exceptions to its universal application, and have allowed the receiver to recover in situations where it is at least
doubtful that the bank could have recovered. Thus, where the bank has acquired deposits by wrongful pledging of securities, the receiver can demand the return of the
securities without restoring the deposits.12 In cases where stock has been sold for less
than par, the receiver can demand the unpaid balance,3 although it seems possible in
this situation that a minority stockholder could also, through action in the name of the
corporation, force the payment of the balance.
In contrast to this federal authority there is general unanimity in the state supreme
courts, 4 supported by some Federal decisionss that where a third party's fraudulent
bonds have induced creditors' reliance, there is an exception to the doctrine that the
receiver stands in the position of the bank. 6 These courts allow the receiver recovery
in an action on the bonds. In clothing their decisions in familiar legal concepts, the
courts occasionally speak as though the bank itself, as a solvent corporation, might
have recovered. Thus, some of these courts base their conclusions on finding what they
call sufficient consideration to support the contract; 7 others find the bank was not the
"accommodated party."' 8 A few courts have felt that the proper legal concept for
disallowing the maker's defense could be found in the "parol evidence rule."9 If the
bank, however, rather than the receiver, were to bring the action, it seems unlikely
that the courts would employ these concepts to allow the bank recovery, since there
was no quid pro quo and the officer in granting release from liability by the collateral
contract would be considered to have bound the bank.2 Two Illinois decisions have
held that the receiver "when attempting to marshall the assets of such bank for the
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benefit of its creditors is in law an innocent holder of such assets""2
and, therefore, the
defense of the third party available against the bank would not run against the receiver. A majority of the state courts have avoided this fiction and the difficulties of
the other concepts by basing their decisions on estoppel." This principle, which seems
more dearly to explain what the courts are actually doing, is that a party to a fraud
perpetrated against the bank examiners and the creditors is estopped from alleging
lack of consideration, release from liability and illegal contract.
The reasoning and result of these cases employing estoppel are in keeping with demands of public policy23 that neither bank examiners nor creditors should be victims
of fraudulent arrangements with outsiders. Even the federal courts allow receivers to
recover against officers and directors24 whose fraudulent acts were detrimental to creditors. There seems to be little justification for a limitation in suits against the officers'
co-tort feasors. 25 Yet the court in the instant case, invoking the principlt of stare decisis, allows one who has made the fraud possible to go with impunity.

Constitutional Law-Municipalities-Minimum Wage Law for Firemen-[Illinois],
-The Illinois "Firemen's Minimum Wage Act"' provides that the salary to be paid
regular firemen in any municipality having a population of more than 25,000, but less
than i5o,ooo inhabitants shall be not less than $175.00 per month. A petition for
mandamus was filed on the relation of the active members of the fire department of
the city of Springfield to compel the city of Springfield and certain of its officers to pay
the amounts required by the act and to levy taxes for that purpose. The defendants
contended that the act was unconstitutional in that it was special legislation, 2 and it
created a corporate debt of the city without its consent,3 and that the act is incomplete
and in conflict with existing statutes. On appeal from a judgment and orders granting
the petition, held (one dissent), affirmed. People ex rel. Moshier v. City of Springfield.4
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